DAVID M. REEB
Mr. and Mrs. Lin Jo Yin Professor
Senior Fellow, Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research
Fellow, Academy of International Business
I am a Professor at the National University of Singapore and hold the Mr. and Mrs. Lin Jo Yan Professorship in Banking and Finance. I serve as a Senior Fellow of the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER), a Fellow at the Academy of International Business (AIB), the Director of Research at the Centre for Asset Management Research and Investments (CAMRI), and as the Director of Business Doctoral Programs in NUS Business School.
My research interests range from founding-family ownership to the properties of global innovation, spanning consumer protection in financial intermediation to diversity in the workforce. Current projects include investigating the impact of family ownership on financial misconduct, service quality by insurance companies, comparative bias in global R&D efficiency, the gender gap in innovation, and insider trading of corporate customers and suppliers. Over the past several years, my work has appeared in the most influential academic journals in accounting, economics, finance, law, and management.
This research has been featured in the Wall Street Journal, BusinessWeek, The Economist, Forbes, the Financial Times, the International Herald Tribune, Inc Magazine, SmartMoney, MSNBC, CNN, Bloomberg TV, and several other major newspapers and business magazines in the US, Canada, Europe, Australia and Asia.
CEO Confidence and Unreported R&D
Management Science, Forthcoming
We investigate whether managerial traits influence corporate decisions to provide mandatory financial disclosures. Our results indicate that confident-CEO firms are 24 percent more likely to report their R&D expenditures relative to cautious-CEO firms. Exploiting staggered, state-level regulatory shocks and changes in CEO type, we find substantial evidence that cautious-CEO firms fail to report R&D expenditures. After a shock to managerial reporting-liability, cautious-CEO firms exhibit a 35 percent larger reduction in unreported R&D relative to confident-CEO firms. Interestingly, confident-CEO firms do not exhibit more innovation than their cautious-CEO counterparts after taking into account their differing propensities to report corporate R&D. Overall, our analysis suggests that the precision or reliability of mandatory disclosures systematically varies with managerial characteristics.
Playing the Boys Game: Golf Buddies and Board Diversity
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 2016
We study the participation of women in golf, a social activity with over four-fifths male participation, on their likelihood of serving on a board of directors. Exploiting a novel dataset of golf games in Singapore, we find that woman golfers enjoy a 74% higher likelihood of serving on a board relative to male golfers. A woman’s probability of serving on the board in more hierarchal firms or those in predominately male industry increases by 116% to 158% when she plays golf. Further tests help alleviate concerns that athletic skill, rather than social networking, drive these results. In sum, our results suggest that "playing the boys game" facilitates women’s directorships in publicly traded firms.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2015
A large subset of firms (about 42% of public firms) fails to report any information about R&D in their accounting statements. We document that 10.5% of missing R&D firms exhibit patent activities. Matching firms with missing R&D to those with zero R&D, shows that non-reporting firms file 14 times more patents than firms that report zero R&D. Strikingly, Pseudo-Blank R&D firms (missing R&D firms with patent activity) demonstrate patent filings analogous to the bottom 90%-95% of the positive R&D population. We provide simple Monte Carlo simulations to contrast the results of considering missing R&D data as zero R&D, as zero R&D plus an indicator variable, or alternatively using the industry average plus an indicator variable for missing R&D.